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ARGUMENT
I. APPELLEE'S BRIEF CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT
FACTUAL INACCURACIES.
Virtually every statement contained within the Brief of Appellee Houston Casualty
Company ("HCC") is premised upon some inaccurate construction of the facts. Once the
factual inaccuracies are identified and corrected, there is absolutely no basis for any of

•

HCC's arguments against coverage under the Policy.
Perhaps the most gross misconstruction of the facts is reflected by the complete
failure of HCC to acknowledge the existence of the Herriman Listing Agreement. The
Brief of Appellant discusses the listing agreement and how it related to the arguments
that Seegmiller was working for a "fee," that Seegmiller was working as "a real estate
agent," and that Seegmiller was working "on behalf of' Prudential. HCC provided
absolutely no response to a total of four pages of argument concerning this matter
contained within Appellants' Brief on pages 42-45.
The Brief of Appellant also establishes that Seegmiller was paid $165,000.00 for
his services with regard to the Herriman Transaction. Pages 38-39 and 46 of the Brief of
Appellant discuss the payment of the $165,000.00 to Seegmiller as a "fee" that he earned
"as a real estate agent."

Pursuant to both the Utah Code and the provisions of

Seegmiller's contract with Prudential, discussed on pages 42-46 of the Brief of Appellant,
the $165,000.00 fee was directly and expressly regulated by the relationship between
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•
Seegmiller and Prudential as agent and broker. Again, HCC entirely ignores the Utah
Code and the contract provisions.
Instead, HCC asserts that Seegmiller did not "receive or expect to receive" any fee
in connection with his activity. This error affects Appellee' s Brief on pages 8-10, 11 , 16-

•

18, 22-23, 25-26, 30-34, and 40. On page 32 of Appellee's Brief, HCC even quotes
Sterling Barnes as saying that the fee was paid for "putting the deal together." HCC
acknowledges on page 33 of its Brief that " Seegmiller received [the payment] for getting
Plaintiffs to invest with Barnes, Valley View, and Maxwell." HCC acknowledges on
page 10 of its Brief that "Seegmiller received $165,000.00 for bringing Plaintiffs' money
into the deal." In other testimony from Sterling Barnes, Sterling Barnes also stated, "the
other part where Bobby could make some money was if he sold lots for [Plaintiffs] then
on the sale of those lots he would have acted as their real estate agent." [R.5025-73.]
The next fact which HCC repeatedly misrepresents in its brief concerns Robert
Seegmiller's other interests in the Herriman Transaction. In the Memorandum Decision
and Order, Judge Toomey held that Seegmiller was acting as a real estate agent.
Although there was an issue of fact as to whether he was the Plaintiffs' real estate agent
or not, Judge Toomey stated on page 8 of the Memorandum Decision and Order:
Even if a real estate agent is not acting in the capacity of agent for another party,
he still owes certain duties to all parties to any transaction in which he is involved.
Dudgeon v. Jones, 615 P.2 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). Under the Utah
Administrative Code Section 126-2(f), an agent involved in a transaction must
disclose in writing his agency relationships. He must disclose in writing to all
parties of the transaction any compensation he will receive.
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HCC's statements that Seegmiller had an ownership interest in the Herriman property are
patently false. In the Herriman Transaction, Valley View Estates was the Seller and the
plaintiffs were the proposed buyer under the terms of a written Real Estate Purchase
Contract which listed Seegmiller as plaintiffs agent. Nonetheless, HCC expressly asserts
that Seegmiller had an ownership interest in the Herriman Transaction on pages 8, 11 and
22 (footnote 7) of its Brief. HCC then implies that the asserted ownership interest, and
not the payment of the $165,000.00 fee as described by Judge Toomey, represents a
"personal interest" 1 of Seegmiller on pages 13, 16-18, 22-23, 26-30. 33 and 36 of its
Brief.
There are several instances throughout Appellee's Brief in which HCC treats
allegations of the original pleadings or correspondence as if they were proven facts.
When HCC uses allegations, instead of actual evidence establishing a fact there was
inadequate evidence to establish the allegations as they appeared in the Complaint. This
willingness to treat allegations as though they were the facts creates a problem for two
1

As discussed in Argument II, below, the confusion generated by HCC concerning the
meaning of the reference by Judge Toomey to Seegmiller having a "personal interest" in
the transaction as referring to something other than the undisclosed $165,000.00 fee
appears to be the primary reason that the District Court erroneously granted HCC's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the present case. If the "personal interest" of a real
estate agent in receiving compensation for his services means that a real estate agent is
never acting "solely" on behalf of his broker, then none of the real estate agents ever
employed by Prudential have ever been entitled to coverage under the Policy, because
they have all had a "personal interest" in receiving a fee for their services whenever they
have acted as an agent of Prudential. Obviously, that is the type of absurd result that the
courts have rejected when interpreting insurance policies.
Compton16-Replyl.Brief
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parts of HCC's argument. First, as established by case citations from both parties, HCC
cannot use allegations in the Complaint as a basis for denial of coverage while the contest
between the competing allegations are still pending in the trial court.

Second, HCC

ignores the actual evidence in the record which was presented by one of the parties to
establish that the facts were contrary to the allegations contained in the pleadings. Of
particular importance is the testimony of Bruce Tucker concerning his conversations with
Seegmiller concerning Plaintiffs' original assertions of some form of dishonesty by
Seegmiller. As described in the Brief of Appellant on pages 42, Bruce Tucker testified
that in 2006, Seegmiller informed him of the Herriman Transaction, that it was common
practice for Seegmiller to generate listings for Prudential through such activities, and that
Prudential authorized Seegmiller to accept the entire $ 165,000 payment from the
Herriman Transaction.

Bruce Tucker further testified that he told Seegmiller that

Seegmiller did not have to disclose the payment of the fee to the plaintiffs if he was
acting as a consultant, rather than an agent. That testimony was not taken until January
13, 2015

It was after learning that Seegmillers failure to disclose was a result of

improper training that Plaintiffs recognized that they would not be able to prove that
Seegmiller had any dishonest motive. 2

[R. 4935-5021.] Again, the errors perpetuated

2

It should also be noted that with respect to the Highland transaction, all of the tort
claims against Seegmiller have been dismissed pursuant to Seegmiller's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Consequently, I-ICC's attempt to bootstrap in allegations
concerning the Highland Litigation cannot support HCC's innuendo that Seegmiller's
alleged dishonesty in another case preclude coverage for Seegmiller's negligence in the
present case.
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within HCC's arguments concerning these issues appear on pages 10-12, 14-15, 18, 26,
30, 33, 35-36, and 39 of Appellee's Brief.
HCC failed to respond to the extensive briefing contained in pages 42-45 of the
Brief of Appellant addressing Utah law concerning the scope of employment. The facts
that HCC has entirely failed to discuss include (1) the Herriman Listing Agreement that
Seegmiller procured which hires Prudential to sell all of the lots being purchased by
plaintiffs, (2) the deposition testimony of Bruce Tucker, the principal of Prudential, in
which Bruce Tucker testified extensively about his awareness and authorizations of
Seegmiller's activities and receipt of the $165,000 fee in the Herriman Transaction; and
(3) the contractual provisions that establish Seegmiller's activity was within the scope of
his employment on behalf of Prudential. This error affects Appellee's Brief on pages 8,
15, 17-18, 23, 28-30. The very nature of the legal relationship between a broker and an
agent leaves no room for a conclusion that Seegmiller's actions were outside of the scope
of what he daily did "on behalf of' Prudential.
There are numerous other factual misstatements by HCC throughout their brief.
Additional factual inaccuracies include (1) the fact that Seegmiller and Prudential did
dispute HCC's denial of coverage under the Policy (HCC's Brief, pp. 12, 37-38),
addressed in Argument V, below; (2) the factual basis upon which Seegmiller paid the
3

attorneys' fees relative to the Herriman Litigation (HCC Brief, pp.11-12, 30, 37-38); (3)

3

Seegmiller was told by his attorney Dan McDonald that his employment contract with
Prudential required him to pay for Prudential's defense. There is also substantial
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HCC's failure to inform this Court that the trial court in the Highland Litigation denied a
motion to consolidate the Highland Litigatio'n and Herriman Litigation as reflecting a
single series of acts (HCC Brief, p. l l(footnote 5)); and (4) HCC's inaccurate portrayal
of the date upon which the claim against Seegmiller and Prudential was made, by fail ing
to reference the date the Complaint was filed and the date upon which Seegmiller and
Prudential received and reviewed the Complaint with their attorney (HCC Brief, p. 20),
addressed in Argument IV, below.
II. APPELLEE'S BRIEF DEPENDS UPON AN INACCURATE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICY.
HCC's Brief fails to deal with the express coverage provision of the Policy. The
coverage clause is cited in its entirety on page 30 of the Brief of Appellant.

To

paraphrase the coverage provision, " [HCC] shall pay on behalf of [Seegmiller] any
Uudgment] ... as [Seegmiller] acting in a profession described in Item 3 of the
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay ... by reason of any [negligence] by
[Seegmiller] ... ."

The operative terms of the coverage provisions of the Policy are

discussed on pages 31-33 of the Brief of Appellants.
HCC only indirectly addresses the issue of coverage as defined by the coverage
clause. The only phrase within the coverage clause that is related to HCC's argument
concerning coverage is the phrase "acting in a profession described in Item 3 of the

evidence that Dan McDonald advised Seegmiller and Prudential not to report the claim
solely to ensure that the insurance company did not assign the legal work to another finn.
[R. 6524-6575.]
Comptonl6-Replyt.Brief
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Declarations." HCC's Brief fails to discuss the difference between the coverage

•

provisions of the Policy and the definitions of the Policy, or the coverage provisions of
the Policy and the exclusion provisions of the Policy. There is no possible reading of the
coverage provision that would result in the denial of coverage to Mr. Seegmiller. All of
the individual words used by HCC come from somewhere in the Policy other than the
coverage prov1s10n.
Item 3 of the Declarations provides "Named Insureds Profession: See
Endorsement# 1, E-32." The operative provisions of Endorsement# 1 read as follows:
"Named Insureds Profession: Solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate
Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." The identification of the
Named Insureds Profession is not even a complete sentence. It is not a definition of
coverage. It is not an exclusion provision of the Policy. It does not say that the Policy
will only provide coverage if the actions of the Insured are limited to a certain defined set
of activities that are to be construed as within the scope of coverage. Endorsement # 1 is
only a definition of the Named Insureds Profession as a whole.
A simple factual inquiry establishes that none of the words used in the definition
of the Named Insureds Profession actually support any of the arguments being made by
HCC.
The heart of the definition of the Named Insureds Profession is contained in the
words "in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker." There is no
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ambiguity in the Memorandum Decision and Order issued by Judge Toomey that the
basis for her finding of negligence on the part of Seegmiller was that he was working as a
licensed real estate agent. As a result of his real estate license, he had a duty to disclose
two things. First, he was required by law to disclose the scope of his agency to each of
the parties to the transaction. The Plaintiffs thought that he was working as their real
estate agent, because that fact was stated in the REPC, among other things. Seegmiller
asserted that he was just using his real estate license to act as a consultant to Plaintiffs.
Judge Toomey found that because he had a license as a real estate agent, it was his
obligation to clarify that role in writing to the Plaintiffs as a matter of law. The second
thing that Judge Toomey held was that, as a matter of law, a real estate agent has a duty
to disclose to all of the parties to the transaction any fee that he is being paid in the
transaction. Because Mr. Seegmiller did not disclose to the Plaintiffs that he was being
paid a fee of $165,000.00 for the services he was providing to them in putting the
transaction together, that Mr. Seegmiler had breached his duty as a real estate agent to
disclose the fees that he was receiving to all parties to the transaction. 4
"Of non-owned properties" refers to the fact that in the Named Insureds Profession
real estate agents typically don't own the properties that they are listing for sale or with
4

Again, as mentioned in footnote 1, above, and discussed under Argument IV, below, the
District Court' s error which resulted in this appeal stems from the fact that the District
Court appears to have misunderstood that the phrase contained in the Memorandum
Decision and Order issued by Judge Toomey, "failing to disclose a personal interest in
the transaction," referred to something other than $165,000.00 fee being paid to Mr.
Seegmiller. In fact the $165,000 fee was the only interest that Seegmiller had in the
transaction.
Comptonl6-Replyl.Brief
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respect to which they are otherwise providing services in putting together a real estate
transaction. In the present case, Seegmiller had no ownership interest in the Herriman
property. The seller of the property was Valley View Estates. The purchaser of the
property was the Plaintiffs. There was no point in time whatsoever at which Seegmiller
or Prudential were the owner of the property or had any prospect of owning the property. 5
The Herriman Listing Agreement and the REPC were both written agreements whereby
Seegmiller and Prudential were selling the lots that plaintiffs was purchasing from Valley
View Estates.
With regard to the words "for others," the error being made by HCC in their
analysis is they seem to focus on who Seegmiller was working for.

In the Named

Insureds Profession, it is common for real estate agents and brokers to work for one or
both sides of a real estate transaction. Under the definition contained in the Policy it
really doesn't matter who Seegmiller was providing services to or who was paying his
fee. It is a simple fact that he was doing something for someone other than himself.

Even if Seegmiller had taken an interest in any of the Herriman Property, paragraph 4
of Endorsement 3 of the Policy actually provides for coverage if the real estate agent
enters into a contract to resell the property within 90 days. (See Addendum "B" of the
Brief of Appellant, p. HCCComp_000339.) Seegmiller's employment contract even
contained terms encouraging him as a real estate agent to invest in properties as a part of
his employment. Consequently, it should be clear by reading the Policy as a whole that
potential flip transactions were contemplated by the drafter of the Policy and intended to
be included in coverage. Again, the existence of a "personal interest" in a transaction is
not language that comes from the Policy as a basis upon which HCC might exclude any
real estate activity from coverage under the Policy.
5
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As discussed above, Seegmiller was working "for a fee." Endorsement # 1 says
nothing about what the fee should be. It says nothing about whether the fee needs to be a
traditional real estate comm1ss1on or not.
Seegmiller was working for a fee.

As the facts discussed above establish,

In the first place, he was actually paid a fee of

$165,000.00 for the services he performed. In the second place, Seegmiller also secured
a listing agreement to resell the lots purchased by the Plaintiffs. It is plain to see that
Judge Toomey believed that Seegmiller had a legal duty to disclose to the Plaintiffs that
he was working for the undisclosed fee. See the Memorandum Decision and Order, page
8.

Consequently, between the fee he was paid and the fee he expected to receive

pursuant to the Herriman Listing Agreement, it is undisputable that his actions involved a
prospective fee.
HCC focuses the majority of their argument on the legal interpretation of the word
"solely" as contained within the definition of the Named Insureds Profession. HCC does
not address the possibility that some people might read the word "solely" to mean simply
that the Named Insureds Profession is only the profession of providing services as a real
estate agent. Some people might read the word "solely" to mean that the Policy does not
provide coverage for accounting services, legal services or services that might constitute
a profession other than the real estate profession in which Seegmiller and Prudential were
actually engaged and for which they expressly paid premiums for insurance coverage
under the Policy.
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HCC's arguments concerning the significance of the word "solely" are easily
disposed of, because the word only appears m the definition of the Named Insureds
Profession. It is not in the coverage provision and there is no complete sentence in the
definition that would allow anyone to think that the term was being used to limit or
exclude coverage, or do anything other than describe a single profession as a whole and
to preclude the possibility of multiple professions.
If the use of the word "solely" in Endorsement # 1 was intended not only to

identify a single profession as the Named Insureds Profession, but was also to serve the
purpose of infonning the insured that they could lose their insurance coverage if in the
course of the performance of services as a real estate agent or broker they were to engage
in some other activity that involved their own personal interest, then this Court would
have to read the Policy as containing two potential interpretations. And if there are two
potential interpretations of the significance of the word "solely" within the Policy, then
the use of the word "solely" is ambiguous. HCC fails to address in their argument how
the Policy would be interpreted, as a matter of law, if this Court were to determine that
the use of the word "solely" were ambiguous. However, that argument has been fully
briefed in the Brief of the Appellant on pages 33-37. As a matter oflaw, if the arguments
advanced by HCC with regard to the significance of the word "solely" are given any
weight or credibility whatsoever, the only conclusion that this Court can reach is that the
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term is ambiguous and that the construction which must be applied as a matter of law is
the construction that has been proffered by the Appellant in this case.
HCC attempts to argue that Section II(b) of the Policy limits coverage to actions
taken by Seegmiller "on behalf of' Prudential. However, as noted above, HCC entirely

•

failed to respond to the extensive briefing contained in pages 42-45 of the Brief of
Appellant addressing the scope of employment of a real estate agent under Utah law.
Given all of the facts that HCC fails to address concerning the benefits to Prudential of
the Herri'man Listing Agreement, the conversation between Prudential and Seegmiller
concerning the the payment of the $165,000 fee to Seegmiller outside of the brokerage
account as a necessary authorization made pursuant to the provisions of Seegmiller's
employment contract, and the Utah law defining the scope of employment for a real
estate agent, it is clear that that Section II(b) of the Policy is not a factor that could
potentially limit coverage. The same is true with respect to Sections IV(a) (criminal or
fraudulent acts) and Endorsement 3, paragraph 1 (other professions) or paragraph 4
(ownership, other than flipping property) of the Policy. As discussed in Argument I,
above, there are simply no facts to support any application of those Sections to the
present controversy. Moreover, as HCC acknowledges in footnote 17 of their Brief, they
have the burden of proof with regard to all exclusion provisions of the Policy.

III. HCC'S BRIEF CONTRIBUTES NO USEFUL LEGAL
AUTHORITY.

Compton 16-Replyl. Brief
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The majority of the cases cited by HCC in their Brief are proffered for the purpose
of establishing general principles of contract construction. Many of the cases are the
same cases already cited in the Brief of the Appellant for the same principles.
The only case that HCC relies upon extensively for its specific application in the
present case is Walston v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh., Pa., Nos. 3:09-CV112-AC, 3:10-CV-579-AC, 3:10-CV-6126-AC, 2012 WL 2049451 (D. Or. June 6, 2012).

Walston is first introduced on page 22 of HCC's Brief and then is cited repeatedly
through page 29 of HCC's Brief. However, the holding in Walston does not support any
of HCC's arguments .
.In Walston, McCoy was certified by State Farm to sell State Farm products.
McCoy was also working for Willamette. McCoy's position with State Fann involved an
executed agreement identifying her as "Investment Advisor Representative." State Farm
maintained an insurance policy that covered McCoy with respect to claims "arising out of
any actual or alleged Wrongful Act committed by the Investment Advisor Representative
solely while acting in his/her capacity as such." The Walston court found that McCoy's
work as an Investment Advisor Representative for State Farm was factually distinct and
different from the work McCoy provided for Willamette. Consequently, claims brought
by third-parties against McCoy arising out of her services to Willamette were not covered
by the insurance policy that was maintained for the purpose of insuring her services
solely as an Investment Advisor Representative on behalf of State Farm.

Compton16-Replyl. Brief
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The most significant distinction between the Walston case and the present case is
the fact that the word "solely" as used in the State Farm policy appears in the coverage
provision of the State Farm policy and it is used for the express purpose of clarifying that
the policy only provided insurance coverage for McCoy when she was acting as an

•

Investment Advisor Representative for State Farm. The Walston court also pointed out
several other provisions of the State Farm policy which made it clear that the intended
coverage under the State Farm policy was for the purpose of insuring McCoy's actions
while she was working as an Investment Advisor Representative within the scope of what
State Farm had defined as the activities of an Investment Advisor Representative in the
contract. Those provisions did not allow for the possibility that the State Farm insurance
policy would provide insurance coverage for unrelated activities that McCoy might
perform pursuant to her employment with Willamette.
In contrast, in the present case, the Policy does not use the word "solely" in the
coverage. Instead, the meaning of the word "solely" is used to express that only one
profession is being covered by the Policy, which profession is working as a Real Estate
Agent or Broker. Because of the significant factual differences between Walston and the
present case, the Walston case has no application to the present case.
The Walston court did discuss TM v. Executive Risk Indemnity Inc. , 2002 WY
179, 59 P.3d 721 (Wyo. 2002) and Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co.,
197 F.3d 742 (5 th Cir. 1999). In both of those cases, the word "solely" was used in a
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different context and the courts construed the policies in favor of coverage. In both

•

cases, the court found that an ambiguity existed with regard to the use of the word
"solely."

Therefore, it is instructive that where a term is used in a contract has

significance.

•

It is also instructive that where a term allows for an alternative

interpretation of the scope of coverage in the way that it is applied, the resulting
ambiguity will be interpreted in favor of coverage. In contract, there is really nothing

•

that comes out of the Walston case that helps HCC with their argument, particularly in
light ofHCC's erroneous characterization of the facts in the present case.
HCC' s Brief also contains citations to Harani Eng'g & Land Surveying v. Mehar
Inv. Grp. LLC, No. 09-252-RGA, 2012 WL 917566 (D. Del. March 19, 2012). Harani
involved the interpretation of a different definition within an insurance contract. The
policy defined the term "Professional Services" to be limited to "lead studies/consulting
services," which was not broad enough to cover the allegedly defective work at issue in
the case. Consequently, the specifics of how the Harani court interpreted the provisions
of that insurance policy really doesn't have any application at all to the present case.
HCC cites the case of Plank-Greer v. Tannerite Sports, LLC 102 F. Supp.3d 954
(N.D. Ohio 2015), which actually contains more reasoning that works against HCC. In
the Plank case, the individual term being analyzed by the court was the word "only." The
provisions of the policy stated, "individual, you and your spouse are insureds, but only
with respect to the conduct of a business of which you are the sole owner." In Plank, the
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defendant decided to blow up a refrigerator at a birthday party they were throwing for a
friend. The court found that the act of blowing up a refrigerator at a friend's birthday
party did not fall within the scope of "conduct of a business of which you are the sole
owner." In reaching its finding, the court stated, "We must look to the insured's alleged

•

actions themselves--and not to the events leading up to those actions--to determine
whether they w ere business related or personal in nature .... The relevant inquiry was
whether the insured was engaged in business at the moment he entered into a fist fight,
not on the events leading up to the fist fight." (citations omitted). In the present case, the
inquiry is whether with respect to the actions of Seegmiller that resulted in a judgment for
negligence, was that related to the Named Insureds Profession. The clear answer is yes.
Judge Toomey found that Mr. Seegmiller was negligent because of the duties which he
owed to the Plaintiffs as a real estate agent involved in a transaction.

The actions he

was taking at the time were the same action that resulted in the payment to him of a
$ 165,000 fee and that resulted in the signing of the Herriman Listing Agreement whereby
by Seegmiller and Prudential were entitled to a fee from future sales of the plaintiffs' lots.
HCC also cites Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985). Alsop was a
somewhat ridiculous case where a chiropractor attempted to obtain coverage for inj uries
he caused to a patient under his homeowner's insurance policy, even though
homeowner's insurance policy contained an exclusionary clause which expressly stated
that it did not provide coverage for any bodily injury arising out of the rendering of
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professional services.

In rejecting the chiropractor's argument that groundless

accusations should be covered, the court stated, "the emphasis should be placed on the
alleged activities or omissions of the insured which give rise to the claim and not upon

•

the claimants characterization of her legal theories of liability. But for the professional
services which he rendered in connection with the labor and delivery, there could be no
claim at all against defendant." Id. at 390.

•

It is important to note, however, that the way that HCC attempts to apply the Alsop
case is to · attempt to re-characterize the judgment for negligence entered against Mr.

•

Seegmiller. Even though Judge Toomey found that the appropriate cause of action was
negligence, HCC actually argues that this Court should substitute its own interpretation
of the facts and find that Mr. Seegmiller was actually engaged in negligent
misrepresentation.

See Appellant's Brief at page 35, footnote 18.

As discussed in

Argument I, above, HCC's argument is factually dependent upon allegations and other
statements which are not evidence and which have not resulted in any judgments being
entered against Mr. Seegmiller. To the extent that those claims have not already been
dismissed by the trial courts, there is absolutely no reason to think that the judgment for
negligence secured against Mr. Seegmiller will ever be converted into a judgment for
negligent misrepresentation.

They are two extremely dissimilar causes of action.

Moreover, as there is a judgment against Mr. Seegmiller for negligence, Plaintiffs are
entitled to make a claim under the Policy right now.
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IV. THE 2006 POLICY APPLIES.
Even though HCC acknowledges on page 20 of its Brief that Prudential's three
HCC Professional Lability Policies contain the same material provisions, the significance
of identifying the correct Policy is discussed Argument VI, below.
As HCC acknowledges, the three Prudential Policies are all "claims-made"
policies. As HCC acknowledges, the Policies define a claim as "a demand received by
the Insured for compensation of damages, including the service of a suit. ..." The
lawsuit was filed by the Plaintiffs on November 14, 2007.

The filing of a lawsuit

constitutes the "making" of a claim under a claims-made policy. See AOK Lands, Inc. v.
Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1993). The lawsuit was received by the
Insured on November 19, 2007. Daniel McDonald of the law firm of Smith Hartvigsen
met with both Seegmiller and Bruce Tucker as the principal of Prudential on November
19, 2007. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the allegations contained in the
Complaint and to determine how the insured parties wanted to respond. Pursuant to Item
7 of the Declaration of each of the Policy, the expiration date of the 2006 Policy was
November 26, 2007. Therefore, the claim was made against the Insured and received by
the Insured during the policy period of the 2006 Policy. [R.5964-6026.]

V. THERE HAS BEEN NO WAIVER OF COVERAGE.
Even under the facts as HCC has sought to portray them, nothing by Plaintiffs,
Seegmiller or Prudential constitutes a waiver or loss of coverage under Utah law.
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HCC is not entitled to deny coverage on the basis of late reporting of the Claim.
Utah Code Ann.,§ 31A-21-312(2) expressly states, "Failure to give notice or file proof of
loss as required by Subsection ( 1)(b) does not bar recovery under the policy if the insurer
fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure." See also Mullin v. Travelers Indemnity
Co. of Connecticut, 541 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008) (insurance company must show

prejudice in order to deny coverage on the basis of failure to give timely notice of a
claim, applying notice provisions identical to the notice requirement in the Policy).
In order to demonstrate prejudice, a party must prove that they suffered some real
harm from a legal standpoint. See State v. Syddall, 444 P.2d 753 (Utah 1968). For
example, one test of prejudice is whether a party "is now less able to obtain the evidence
required ... " Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 1998).
HCC was notified of the Claims just before the substantive proceedings began in
the case. HCC could have easily intervened and participated in every aspect of the case
from addressing the initial pleadings through discovery and all further motion practice.
When an Insurer makes a decision to deny coverage, they cannot thereafter claim
prejudice when the Insured thereafter becomes subject to a Judgment or even enters into a
settlement with respect to the Claims against them. See Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.,
2006 UT 37,

i1 29 - 30, 140 P.3d 1210 (when an insurance company gambles on the

possibility that it can avoid any obligation for the claims by refusing to provide a defense,
it is estopped from second guessing the outcome of the action).
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HCC cites IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT, 3, 196 P.3d
588 for the proposition that, "waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."

Id. at ,r 16. In the same paragraph, the IHC Court actually identified the standard for
establishing the existence of a waiver.
To establish waiver, a defendant must show that the plaintiff had (1) an existing
right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) intent to relinquish the right.
" [W]aiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." m
D&K I., we held that "[w]aiver is an intensely fact dependent question."

Id. at,r 16.
Utah law provides a six-year statute of limitation for a party to bring a claim for
breach of a written contract. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-309. Failure to earlier bring a
lawsuit against a party that breaches a contract has never been construed as a waiver of
the right to bring a claim for breach of contract.
HCC's own phone log shows that the att orney for Seegmiller and Prudential
disputed with the attorney from HCC, the conclusions she w as asserting concerning Utah
law. Coverage counsel then sent a letter dated March 2, 2010 to HCC pointing out the
specifics of the dispute that the Insureds were raising concerning insurance coverage. In
HCC's denial letter dated March 23, 2010, that HCC denied receiving a copy of the
March 2, 2010 letter, even though that letter was found in HCC's insurance files.
Prudential subsequently followed up and inquired concerning HCC's response to the
March 2, 2010 letter. HCC responded to Prudential's subsequent inquiry by asserting
that they had already considered the March 2, 20 10 letter and saw no reason to change
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their position concerning coverage. Having already informed HCC concerning the error
they were making in denying coverage, the logical next step for Prudential and/or
Seegmiller was to file a lawsuit against HCC for breach of contract. That was an action
that they could not take under the terms of the Policies, because Section VIII(i) provides,
No action shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent thereto,
there shall have been full compliance with all the te1ms of this Policy, nor until the
amount of the Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either
by Judgment against the Insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the
Insured, the Claimant and the Company. Any person or organization or the legal
representative thereof who has secured such Judgment or written agreement shall
thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent of the insurance
afforded by the Policy.
Consequently, the lawsuit filed against HCC after the entry of Judgment is the next
logical action that HCC should have expected.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 la-22-202, "Protection of Third-paiiy Claimants," actually
prohibits any agreement between an insurer and an insured after the occurrence of an
injury from entering into an agreement to retroactively abrogate insurance coverage to the
detriment of any third-party Claimant.

In the present case, the Policies themselves

prevent such a waiver of coverage by their own express provisions.

Section VIII(i)

actually grants a third-party right of action to anyone who obtains a Judgment against an
Insured that meets the terms for coverage under the Policy, as follows: "Any person or
organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such Judgment or written
agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent of the
insurance afforded by the Policy." As a matter of both contract and public policy, neither

Compton 16-Replyl.Brief

25

•

Seegmiller nor Prudential had the right to waive that provision of the Policies on behalf
of Plaintiffs.
Likewise, there is no basis upon which HCC can assert any form of estoppel in the
present case. The failure to bring a lawsuit against an insurance carrier for breach of
contract prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation has never b een construed as the
basis for an estoppel c.laim. Prudential and Seegmiller applied for insurance coverage.
When they received a verbal denial, they had another attorney write a letter to the
insurance company attempting to correct HCC' s incorrect application of Utah law. HCC
then denied coverage based on its erroneous application of Utah law and misconstruing
the applicable policy. Sometime later, Prudential asked whether HCC had considered the
additional information they provided concerning Utah law. HCC responded with a letter
stating that they had reviewed the additional information and found no reason to change
their position. Neither Prudential nor Seegmiller did anything to disclaim their right to
insurance coverage. They were simply the victim of HCC' s breach of the insurance
contract. L ikewise, HCC did nothing to change its position in reliance upon any action or
inaction by Prudential and Seegmiller. HCC had already taken the position that they
were denying insurance coverage.

Continuing to deny insurance coverage does not

constitute a change in position that would support an estoppel. Finally, HCC has suffered
no injury that would support a claim for equitable estoppel.
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The case cited by HCC, Youngblood v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 158
P.3d 1088, identifies three elements for establishing equitable estoppel. Id. at

~

14.

However, the Youngblood case actually involved circumstances of promissory estoppel in
which an insurance agent was accused of misrepresenting the coverage provisions of the
policy. The case did not involve a situation in which the insurer was claiming that they
were entitled to protection because the insured failed to earlier challenge their wrongful
denial of insurance coverage. [R.5964-6026.]

VI. HCC BREACHED ITS DUTY OF COVERAGE WELL IN ADVANCE
OF ANY BASIS FOR ITS DENIALS.
HCC acknowledges that "under Utah law, "an Insurer 'has a duty to defend the
Insured against a liability claim which is covered or which is potentially covered.' "

Summerhays Co. L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 2014 UT 28,

~

36, 332 P.3d 908

(quoting Mesmer v. MD. Auto Ins. Fund, 725 a. 2d 1053, 1061 (MD. 1999))." (emphasis
added) HCC also acknowledges in its response that "generally, an insurer's duty to
defend arises out of a potentially covered claim and last until the conclusion of the
underlying lawsuit, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage."
(citing 14 Couch on Insurance§ 200:47 (3d ed. 2014)).
On January 21, 2010, Dan McDonald provided HCC with notice of the claims
being made in civil nos. 070916208 and 070916209. Mr. McDonald included a copy of
12 different documents with his letter making a Claim on the Policies.
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HCC was aware that the Policies were claims-made policies. The Complaints that
were enclosed with the letter from Mr. McDonald provided the date of the Complaints as
November 14, 2007, thus arising during the Policy Period of the 2006 Policy. A copy of
the summons was not enclosed. Therefore, HCC did not have any basis upon :Which to

•

believe that the Claims had first been made against their insureds at any time other than
during the Policy Period of the 2006 Policy.
Notwithstanding HCC's actual knowledge that the Claims arose under the 2006
Policy, the March 23, 2010 letter denying coverage analyzed the Claims under the
provisions of the 2008 Policy. The Claims records produced by HCC reveal that HCC
was aware of the existence of the 2006 Policy and the 2007 Policy. However, in order to
deny coverage for the Claim based upon the information available to HCC, HCC had to
analyze coverage under the 2008 Policy. That was the only way that HCC could deny
coverage to their Insured on the premise that the Insureds had prior knowledge of
litigation at the time they applied for the 2008 Policy.
The next mistake made by HCC in their letter of March 23, 2010 was that they
analyzed the Policies as though the Policies were claims-reported policies, in which case
coverage would arise at the time the Insured reported the claim to HCC. They asserted in
the letter of March 23, 2010 that because the Policy Period of the 2008 Policy had ended
on November 27, 2009, the reporting of the Claim a few months later in January of 2010
was the reason that the Claims were excluded from coverage.
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The third mistake made by HCC on March 23, 2010 was the assertion that under

•

Utah law they were not required to show any prejudice whatsoever when denying a claim
on the basis of late reporting by the Insured. HCC never asserted at the time that it had

•

suffered any prejudice. Dan McDonald was aware that under Utah law the Claim could
not be denied unless HCC demonstrated prejudice. A conversation took place between
Dan McDonald and the attorney for HCC on February 4, 2010, in which Dan McDonald
informed HCC's attorney concerning Utah law.

When HCC refused to change its

position based on the information provided by Mr. McDonald verbally, Mr. McDonald
send an email to Leslie Slaugh, hiring him to provide the appropriate citations to Utah
law to HCC on behalf of the Insureds. Mr. Slaugh sent a letter dated March 2, 2010 to
HCC, detailing the requirements of Utah law concerning HCC's duty to demonstrate
prejudice, including citations to Utah statutory and case law authority. Notwithstanding
the receipt of Mr. Slaugh' s letter containing the correct citations to Utah law, HCC issued
its letter denying coverage on March 23, 2010 asserting that they had not received the
letter of March 2, 2010, and denying coverage on the basis that the Claims were not
reported during the Policy Period of the relevant Policies, and asserting that HCC was not
required to show prejudice, citing a Utah statute and a Utah case that involved a claimsreported policy rather than a claims-made policy.
None of the three reasons that HCC set forth in the letter of March 23, 2010 for the
actual denial of coverage are currently being argued by HCC. They have changed their
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position and their arguments with respect to all three reasons for denying coverage. They
now acknowledge that the Policy is a claims-made policy. HCC continues to act in bad
faith w ith respect to the denial of coverage with respect to the judgment. Rather than
applying the correct 2006 Policy and acknowledging that a claim was made against the

•

Insureds during the Policy Period of the 2006 Policy, HCC is now attempting to argue
that the Claim first arose under the 2007 Policy. The only reason they are making that
argument is because it's the only way that they can claim that the Insured had knowledge
of the Claim prior to the inception of the 2007 Policy's Period. However, in making that
argument, they actually admit that the Claim was first "made" during the 2006 Policy
Period and that the Insureds "received" a copy of the Claim during the 2006 Policy
Period. Otherwise, how could HCC argue that the Insured had knowledge of the Claim
prior to the inception of the Policy?
Next, HCC produced a witness in response to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice.
That witness stated that he was not aware of any basis for denial of coverage under the
provisions of the Policies other than what was stated in the March 23, letter.
Pending claims against Prudential are purely for their negligent supervisor of
Seegmiller, as an agent licensed through their brokerage. On the basis of the very case
law acknowledged by HCC in their brief, HCC "has a duty to defend the Insured against
a liability claim which is covered or which is potentially covered ... until the conclusion
of the underlying lawsuit, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for
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coverage." Yet, HCC has not stepped up to provide a defense to Prudential or Seegmiller
with regard to any of the potentially covered claims. In fact, HCC has no basis upon
which to claim that any of the other allegations, other than the covered negligent actions,
will ever be established in the underlying cases. Seegmiller and Prudential have come up
with a reasonable explanation for their negligence. The burden of proof in a fraud case is
simply too high. Because they already have a Judgment, Plaintiffs have no intention of
ever pursuing such claims against Seegmiller. [R.5964-6026.]

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court:
a. Correct the District Court's interpretation of the Policy and direct the District
Court that the insurance Policy issued by Houston Casualty Company does provide
coverage to Robert Seegmiller with respect to the judgment for negligence issued against
Robert Seegmiller in Civil No. 070916209 on June 7, 2012; and
b. Direct the District Court that as judgment creditors, plaintiffs are entitled to
coverage pursuant to Section VIII(i) of the insurance Policy issued by Houston Casualty
Company with respect to the direct action brought against Houston Casualty Company
with respect to the judgment for negligence entered against Robert Seegmiller in Civil
No. 070916209 on June 7, 20 12.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2016.

Attorney for Appellants
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